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Despite heavy borrowing in recent years, the United States has financed its large current account
deficits without experiencing an unusual buildup in foreign investors’ holdings of U.S. assets. A new
analysis suggests that this somewhat surprising development is attributable largely to rapid financial
globalization, with cross-border flows worldwide rising as fast as flows into the United States.
However, it could be harder for the country to sustain large deficits on favorable terms if the current
wave of globalization subsided or the rate at which U.S. investors buy foreign assets increased.
T
o finance its large current account deficit, the
United States must attract the equivalent
amount of surplus foreign savings. In recent
years, the U.S. deficit has been large enough to absorb the
lion’s share of surpluses generated abroad. Indeed, from
1999 through 2006, the cumulative U.S. borrowing of $4.4
trillion amounted to some 85 percent of the net external
financing provided by countries with surplus saving.
Despite this heavy borrowing, however, the United
States has been the destination for little more than 30 per-
cent of total gross cross-border investments by other coun-
tries, a figure that only slightly exceeds the U.S. share of
global GDP and is below the U.S. weight in global financial
portfolios. As a result, the United States has been able to
finance its large current account deficits without laying
claim to a disproportionate share of global foreign invest-
ment or causing foreign external portfolios to become
dominated by U.S. assets.
This edition of Current Issuessheds light on these seem-
ingly incompatible developments by examining the
financing of the U.S. current account deficit from a global
perspective. We find that the recent period of large U.S.
current account deficits has also been one of rapid finan-
cial globalization, with surplus and deficit countries alike
investing a record fraction of their saving abroad. This
sharp increase in cross-border investments has made it
possible for the United States to emerge as the world’s
principal net borrower while receiving an unremarkable
share of other countries’ gross external investments.
Facilitating this development is the fact that the rise in U.S.
cross-border investment has lagged the rise in global
investment by other countries.
These findings have important implications for the sus-
tainability of the U.S. current account deficit. In our view,
it might be harder to finance continued large current
account deficits on favorable terms if the recent wave of
financial globalization were to subside: The United States
would then have to attract a larger share of other countries’
foreign investments. It might also be harder to finance the
deficit on favorable terms were U.S. investors to participate
more fully in financial globalization by investing a larger
fraction of domestic saving abroad.
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Global Saving and Global Capital Flows
A country’s current account balance is equal to the difference
between domestic saving and domestic investment spend-
ing. A country that saves more than it invests at home sends
its surplus abroad to purchase foreign assets. One that saves
less than it invests finances the shortfall by issuing liabilities
to foreign investors. The accumulated history of current
account surpluses or deficits, along with capital gains and
losses on past investments, determines a country’s net inter-
national investment position.
However, the net flow of capital across international bor-
ders often comes alongside much larger grossflows. After all,
even countries running current account surpluses receive
foreign investment inflows, and even countries running
deficits invest abroad. Thus, the current account balance also
obeys the accounting identity:
CA balance = domestic purchases of foreign assets
- foreign purchases of domestic assets.1
Analysis of the sustainability of large U.S. current account
deficits generally focuses on the implied behavior of U.S. net
international liabilities. There is good reason for this empha-
sis. Formally, sustainability requires a path for the deficit that
keeps net liabilities from rising indefinitely as a share of GDP.
More concretely, continued deficits of the recent scale would
likely push U.S. net liabilities as a share of GDP to an unprece-
dented level for a large advanced economy—a prospect that
naturally raises concerns about whether such a trajectory
would be compatible with economic and financial stability.2
Moreover, investors’ knowledge or belief that a substantially
weaker dollar may be required to hold U.S. net liabilities to a
sustainable path could lead to a general attempt to reduce U.S.
exposures in advance of the dollar’s fall, potentially setting off
sudden and disruptive dollar adjustment.
However, the behavior of gross foreign claims on the
United States is also important for sustainability analysis.
After all, the capital losses that foreign investors might suffer
from potential dollar weakness depend on the scale of gross
rather than net claims. So too do the incentive for and poten-
tial magnitude of portfolio repositioning given a reassess-
ment of risk and return on dollar assets.
In this connection, concerns about U.S. current account
sustainability have often been based on the premise that the
U.S. deficit is causing foreign portfolios to become increas-
ingly tilted toward dollar assets. If so, while large deficits
continue, foreign investors’ reluctance to see portfolios grow
even more unbalanced should exert ongoing downward
pressure on the dollar and other U.S. asset prices. Some see
that risk-tolerance limits for dollar exposure might be close
at hand. As former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volker
(2005) colorfully put it, “At some point, both central banks
and private institutions will have their fill of dollars.”3 Even
many who take a more benign view of U.S. and global imbal-
ances argue that foreign investors’ desire to keep exposure to
U.S. financial assets from climbing higher will act as the ulti-
mate check on the capacity of the United States to sustain
large current account deficits.4
In fact, foreign purchases of U.S. assets have recently been
well in excess of the U.S. current account deficit (Chart 1).
Since 2002, the additional foreign investment in the United
States has averaged roughly 5 percent of U.S. GDP. The coun-
terpart to this additional inflow has been a continuing flow of
U.S. investment abroad. Indeed, despite considerable year-to-
year volatility, outflows from the United States have generally
2
1Gross domestic and foreign purchases are measured net of purchases and
sales of foreign assets by domestic residents and net of purchases and sales of
U.S. assets by foreign residents, respectively.
2Higgins, Klitgaard, and Tille (2007) explain how favorable exchange rate and
other valuation changes have held U.S. net liabilities as a share of GDP relatively
steady in recent years, despite large current account deficits.
3Similarly, discussing U.S. current account sustainability, Lawrence Summers
(2006) remarked that “There are surely limits on the tolerance of foreign
investors for increased claims on the U.S.”
4Alan Greenspan (2003) summarized the portfolio balance view as follows: “In
the end, it will likely be the reluctance of foreign country residents to accumulate
additional debt and equity claims against U.S. residents that will serve as the
restraint on the size of tolerable U.S. imbalances in the global arena.”
Commenting on U.S. current account sustainability, Congressional Budget Office
Director Peter Orszag (2007) observed that “Foreign investors will not be willing
to purchase U.S. claims at current rates of return indefinitely as their portfolios
become more and more concentrated in such assets.”
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Note: The statistical discrepancy in balance-of-payments accounts is attributed equally 
to outflows and inflows.
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been higher than they were before the period of large
deficits. Last year saw outflows, inflows, and the current
account deficit all reach record highs as shares of GDP.
The fact that foreign investment in the United States has
been outpacing the U.S. current account deficit might appear
to support concerns about foreign portfolios growing increas-
ingly lopsided: Perhaps foreign investors will bump up against
tolerance limits for dollar exposure that much sooner.
However, rising foreign investment in the United States
does not necessarily imply a rising dollar weight in global
portfolios: Flows to the United States must be rising more
rapidly than flows to other countries (abstracting from valu-
ation changes). To determine whether this has in fact
occurred, we consider financial flows involving the United
States from a global perspective. Our findings overturn the
widespread presumption that global portfolios are tilting
more toward claims on the United States. Rather, rising
investment in the country has occurred during a period of
rapid financial globalization, in the form of surging cross-
border investment worldwide.
Taking the Measure of Financial Globalization
Financial globalization refers to the ongoing integration of
once poorly connected national financial markets. A key
aspect of globalization is a decline in financial home bias—
the tendency for domestic saving to be invested predomi-
nan tly a t ho me,  with do mestic po rtf olios til ted hea vily
toward home-country assets.
Recent years have in fact seen a pronounced decline in
home bias, with a record fraction of global saving going to
cross-border investments (Chart 2).5 Indeed, in 2005 and
2006, the share of global saving invested abroad climbed
past 50 percent for the first time. (Chart 2 shows five-year
averages, to smooth out business cycle fluctuations; thus, the
values shown for 2005 and 2006 are a bit below 50 percent.)
The trend toward greater cross-border investment has been
worldwide, with the United States, other advanced
economies, and emerging economies all investing a
markedly higher fraction of saving abroad.
Significantly, U.S. external investment as a share of sav-
ing has risen less dramatically than the share for other
countries. Comparing the mid-1990s with the middle of the
current decade, we see that U.S. outflows as a share of
domestic saving have risen by roughly 20 percentage
points; the increase abroad has been close to 35 percentage
points. As a result, the United States now lags the rest of the
world by a considerable margin in the share of national
saving invested abroad.
It is instructive to consider the smaller scale of outflows
from the United States in light of the current account balance-
of-payments accounting identity described earlier. In particu-
lar, had outflows from the United States risen in line with the
global trend, the country would have required that much more
inward investment to finance an unchanged sequence of cur-
rent account deficits. In turn, more robust U.S. demand for
foreign assets, and the consequent need to attract additional
inflows, would have placed downward pressure on the dollar,
leading to at least somewhat smaller deficits.
This scenario illustrates a more general point: develop-
ments that lead to shifts in gross capital flows have impor-
tant feedback effects on net flows.
U.S. Assets in Global Portfolios
Has the United States been receiving a disproportionate
share of global cross-border investments? To answer this
question, we compare the share of capital flows going to the
United States with the relative size of the U.S. economy or,
where possible, the size of the relevant capital market. In
particular, portfolio equity and fixed-income flows are
assessed relative to the U.S. share of the global equity and
fixed-income markets: This is the metric Wall Street equity
and fixed-income strategists use to determine whether a rec-
ommended portfolio allocation is underweight, neutral, or
overweight in a given national market.6Unfortunately, there is
no clear measure of the size of the relevant market for foreign
5The data in Chart 2 contain a series break that reflects the creation of the euro
area in 1999. Pre-1999, our measure of cross-border investment includes invest-
ment by one euro area country in another; beginning in 1999, it excludes such
flows. As a result, measured outflows before 1999 are higher than they would be
under a consistent series. While it would be possible to construct a consistent
series that includes intra-EMU (European Economic and Monetary Union) flows
after 1999, we believe that it is more appropriate to treat the EMU as a single
financial market.
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics and
World Economic Outlook.
Chart 2
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direct investment (FDI) or banking and miscellaneous
investments. However, international portfolios based on rel-
ative economic output or GDP seem a sensible choice.7 In an
investment strategy with a neutral U.S. weight, the share of
cross-border investment placed in the United States would
be equal to the relevant scaling factor. For example, since the
United States accounts for 28 percent of global GDP, a neutral
investment allocation would have the United States receiving
28 percent of the flow of global FDI investments.8
Using our neutral benchmark, we find that, from 2002 to
2006, foreign investors placed a total of $6.1 trillion in new
investments in the United States, or slightly more than 30
percent of total outflows from countries other than the
United States (Table 1). Our calculations show that a neutral
investment allocation based on country GDP and market
capitalization weights would have resulted in the United
States receiving $7.0 trillion in foreign capital. Thus, global
cross-border investments were tilted away from the United
States, by a factor of 0.87 (that is, 6.1/7.0). Significantly, a
similar tilt ratio prevailed during 1997-2001, when the U.S.
current account deficit was considerably smaller, and a
higher tilt ratio prevailed during 1992-96, when the deficit
was far smaller.9 Indeed, over the last twenty years, foreign
external investments have never displayed any discernible
tilt toward U.S. assets (Chart 3). Simply put, the proliferation
of cross-border investment worldwide has enabled the
United States to finance its growing current account deficits
while receiving a stable or even declining fraction of other
countries’ overall external investments.
A broadly similar pattern is evident across asset categories.
In particular, for FDI, portfolio equity investments, and bank-
ing and other investments, investment in the United States
4
Table 1
Foreign Investment in the United States
Trillions of U.S. dollars and ratio-to-neutral allocation
2002-06 1997-2001 1992-96
All investments 6.1 3.7 1.7
Ratio-to-neutral 0.87 0.85 0.99
Foreign direct investment 0.6 1.1 0.3
Ratio-to-neutral 0.64 0.93 1.10
Portfolio equity 0.4 0.5 0.0
Ratio-to-neutral 0.46 0.64 0.35
Bonds 3.2 1.1 0.8
Ratio-to-neutral 1.11 0.81 0.97
Banking and other 2.0 1.0 0.6
Ratio-to-neutral 0.82 1.01 1.11
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics and World
Economic Outlookdatabase; Datastream global equity indexes; Bank for International
Settlements global bond database; authors’ estimates.  
Note: Ratio-to-neutral refers to foreign investment in the United States relative to an
investment allocation proportional to country weights in global GDP or the relevant global
capital market.  A figure above 1.00 indicates that foreign investors have been investing rel-
atively heavily in the United States.
6These calculations may understate the neutral rate of investment flows to the
United States because a significant share of foreign debt and equity securities
is not readily available for purchase. In some foreign markets, a sizable frac-
tion of market capitalization is locked up in rarely traded corporate cross-
shareholding or government accounts. In others, there are significant restric-
tions on portfolio equity inflows. Several private investment banks have con-
structed indexes based on free float: the value of shares actually available for
purchase. According to the MSCI Barra global index, as of March 31, 2006, the
United States accounted for almost 45 percent of the investable equity market,
compared with 38 percent of global market capitalization. By coincidence, the
numbers are the same for fixed-income debt securities. 
7This measure is viewed in the macro markets literature as a benchmark for all
investments. See, for example, Anthanasoulis, Shiller, and Van Wincoop (1999). 
8For brevity, the discussion omits some details of our procedure. In particular,
for the largest economies, we scale investment in the United States by the U.S.
share in the rest of the world. This includes the EMU, the United Kingdom, and
Japan; before the creation of the EMU, it includes Germany, France, and Italy.
(China and India account for a very small fraction of the global equity and bond
markets; while the two countries account for a larger fraction of GDP, they make
insignificant outbound FDI and miscellaneous investments.) For example, while
the United States now accounts for 28 percent of global GDP, from the perspec-
tive of the euro area, the United States accounts for some 35 percent of rest-of-
the-world GDP.
9Recall that our measure of global cross-border investment includes intra-
EMU flows for the early part of 1997-2001 and for all of 1992-2006. The meas-
ured tilt toward the United States during these earlier periods would have been
even higher had intra-EMU flows been excluded consistently.
Sources: International Monetary Fund; Bank for International Settlements;
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; authors’ calculations. 
Notes: The calculation for market-neutral investment takes total outflows from other
countries as given. The calculation shows the funds that would go to the United States
given portfolio weights based on the U.S. weight in the global capital markets (for equity
and fixed-income securities) or the U.S. weight in global GDP (for foreign direct
investment and banking and other investments).
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during the 2002-06 period was below our neutral benchmark,
and down relative to those benchmarks from 1997 to 2001.
Only fixed-income investments have recently exceeded our
neutral benchmark and, even here, only slightly.
International Investment Positions
A look at international investment positions—the dollar
value of external assets, rather than the flow of new external
investments—supports the results of our flow analysis
(Table 2).10 In particular, other countries’ external portfolios
were tilted slightly toward claims on the United States in
1999, but are now tilted slightly away (1999 provides a con-
venient reference point, as it is the first year the data allow us
to exclude from global external assets the claims of one
European Economic and Monetary Union [EMU] country on
another). The tilt away from the United States comes despite
a near doubling of foreign ownership of U.S. assets, from
$8.4 trillion to $16.2 trillion. The reason is that other coun-
tries’ total cross-border asset holdings rose in even greater
proportion, from $17.9 trillion to $47.5 trillion.11
By asset category, other countries’ stocks of foreign
direct investments, once sharply tilted toward the United
States, now show a clear tilt away. Portfolio equity invest-
ments have shifted from being tilted slightly toward the
United States to slightly away . The shift away from the
country in FDI and portfolio equity holdings reflects the
similar trend in flows described above as well as the rela-
tively weak performance of the U.S. equity markets.12
Meanwhile, foreign investors have shifted from a somewhat
underweight position in U.S. debt securities and banking
and other assets to a more balanced position. The relatively
modest current tilt in debt securities toward the United
States reflects the explosive growth of cross-border debt
security claims worldwide. While debt security claims on
the United States roughly tripled over the period, so did all
global cross-border holdings.
Alternative Metrics
Our analysis of foreign portfolio exposure to the United
States is based on investment in the country as a fraction of
global cross-border investments. In our view, this approach
illustrates underlying trends while controlling for the ongo-
ing progress of financial globalization. Still, a look at how
exposure to the United States has evolved relative to global
saving and global wealth might shed additional light on the
sustainability of the U.S. current account deficit.
Since 2002, investment in the United States has absorbed
16.5 percent of the rest of the world’s saving, up from 14.3
percent during 1997-2001 and up substantially from 7.0 per-
cent during 1992-96. Is the recent figure high or low? If such
investment were sustained, assuming stable exchange rates
and similar asset price behavior in the United States and
abroad, claims on U.S. assets would trend toward 16.5 per-
cent of total foreign wealth. We cannot know the potential
limits on desired foreign exposure to the United States; the
limits depend, in part, on how far the recent wave of finan-
cial globalization can progress. That said, a 16.5 percent fig-
ure would not be out of line with the U.S. weight in the global
economy and the global financial markets.
It is important to understand what fraction of foreign
wealth today is in the form of claims on the United States.
Unfortunately, no comprehensive measure of foreign wealth
exists.13 The best approach we can take, then, is to consider
10Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) have developed similar metrics for assessing
foreign exposure to the United States.
11The latter figure is an estimate based on incomplete data, as some smaller
countries have not yet reported their 2006 international balance sheets.
12In dollar terms, non-U.S. equity prices rose by 95 percent from year-end
1999 through year-end 2006; U.S. equity prices were up less than 4 percent. As
a result, cross-border equity and FDI claims on countries outside the United
States were swelled by capital gains; claims on the United States were not. That
said, the statistical authorities in a number of countries make only limited val-
uation adjustments to FDI claims, or even assess them at book value.
Note, too, that caution is warranted when drawing welfare conclusions from
shifts in a country’s net international investment position. After all, a U.S. equity
price boom would raise U.S. household wealth, but by raising the value of foreign
claims on the United States, it would worsen the U.S. net position.
Table 2
Foreign Claims on the United States
Trillions of U.S. dollars and ratio-to-neutral allocation
2006 1999
Total claims 16.2 8.4
Ratio-to-neutral 0.94 1.08
Foreign direct investment 3.2 2.8
Ratio-to-neutral 0.77 1.56




Banking and other 4.8 2.0
Ratio-to-neutral 1.00 0.86
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; International
Monetary Fund, International Financial Statisticsand World Economic Outlookdatabase;
Datastream global equity indexes; Bank for International Settlements global bond data-
base; authors’ estimates.
Notes: Ratio-to-neutral refers to foreign claims on the United States relative to a portfolio
allocation proportional to country weights in global GDP or the relevant global capital
market.  A figure above 1.00 indicates that other countries’ external portfolios are tilted
toward claims on the United States. U.S. derivative liabilities are not counted because their
economic value is a small fraction of the quoted notional value.CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE VOLUME 13, NUMBER 11
claims on the United States relative to a measure of foreign
capital market size.14
As an indicator of total capital market size, we take the
sum of equity market capitalization, bond market capitaliza-
tion, and commercial bank assets. (This approach follows
the measure used in the International Monetary Fund’s
Global Financial Stability Report [2007].) We define a proxy
for non-U.S. financial wealth as
Non-U.S. wealth = non-U.S. capital market size
+ claims on U.S. - liabilities to U.S.
According to our calculations, the share of non-U.S.
financial wealth held as U.S. assets has declined very slightly
in recent years, to just 12.3 percent at year-end 2006 (Table
3). We consider this small decline to be well within the mar-
gin of measurement error. In essence, growth in foreign
financial market size has kept pace with growth in foreign
claims on the United States. In dollar terms, non-U.S. equity
market capitalization has increased by a factor of 1.6 since
year-end 1999, bond market capitalization by a factor of 2.1,
and commercial bank assets by a factor of 2.2. These figures
also illustrate a more general point: growth in non-U.S.
financial markets widens the scope for diversification into
U.S. assets.
Turning to tradable securities, we observe that the frac-
tion of foreign fixed-income wealth held in claims on the
United States has increased slightly in recent years, to a still-
low 12 percent at year-end 2006. Given the scale of reserve
accumulation by foreign central banks, the share of foreign
private fixed-income wealth held as claims on the United
States must have declined. The fraction of portfolio equity
wealth held as claims on the United States has also increased
slightly in recent years, to almost 10 percent. Again, while we
cannot know the amount of exposure to U.S. securities that
foreign investors will eventually take on, these figures are
hardly out of line with the size of the United States in the
global markets.15
Our results should assuage concerns about large U.S. cur-
rent account deficits leading to a potentially destabilizing
increase in foreign exposure to U.S. assets. In fact, foreign
investment in the United States has remained broadly in line
with the relative size of the U.S. economy and U.S. capital
markets. Moreover, foreign claims on the United States have
not risen relative to cross-border claims generally or relative
to the size of foreign capital markets. Of course, as we have
already indicated, there may be other good reasons for con-
cerns about the sustainability of large, ongoing U.S. current
account deficits.
Financial Globalization and U.S. Current Account
Adjustment
Rapid growth in cross-border investments worldwide has
left room for the United States to take in large net flows while
receiving an unremarkable fraction of other countries’ total
cross-border investments. But what if the recent wave of
financial globalization were to crest? To address this ques-
tion, we consider a hypothetical scenario.
In recent years, about 50 percent of non-U.S. saving has
been invested abroad, and the United States has received
about one-third of those outflows. Suppose that outflows were
to fall back to 35 percent of saving, roughly the share of U.S.
saving recently recorded for U.S. outflows. The United States
would then have to receive more than 45 percent of the rest of
the world’s foreign investments (assuming that the U.S. cur-
rent account deficit and U.S. outflows remain constant as
shares of GDP and that the foreign saving rate and the relative
size of U.S. and foreign economies are also constant). Under
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Table 3
Foreign Financial Assets and Claims on the United States
Trillions of U.S. dollars
2006 1999
Total financial assets 132.1 65.1
Percentage of claims on the United States 12.3 13.0
Equity securities 25.4 16.3
Percentage of claims on the United States 10.0 9.3
Debt securities 46.9 21.6
Percentage of claims on the United States 12.1 9.7
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; International
Monetary Fund, International Financial Statisticsand World Economic Outlookdatabase;
Datastream global equity indexes; Bank for International Settlements global bond data-
base; authors’ estimates.
Notes: Total financial assets are the sum of portfolio equity holdings, debt security hold-
ings, and commercial bank assets. Percentage of claims on the United States includes a
correction for rest-of-the-world liabilities to the United States. The figures for equity secu-
rities represent a lower bound; see footnote 14 in the text.
13Although we have measures of global equity and bond market capitalization,
a significant fraction of foreign wealth consists of nonsecuritized stakes in
business enterprises.
14The metrics used here were developed in Higgins and Steinberg (2002).
15The figures for the share of non-U.S. equity wealth owing to claims on the
United States should be considered a lower bound. After all, the bulk of foreign
FDI assets in the United States is held by foreign multinationals listed on their
own domestic exchanges. As such, the market value of those companies on the
domestic exchanges should embody the value of their U.S. subsidiaries or affil-
iates. (As a secondary matter, a small part of market capitalization for compa-
nies listed outside the United States reflects minority FDI claims by the United
States.) A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that more than 20 percent
of non-U.S. portfolio equity wealth might come from claims on the United
States, a figure that approaches the U.S. weight in the global economy. However,
that figure appears to have been closer to 25 percent in 1999.such a scenario, foreign investors would most likely require
added compensation for shifting toward an overweight U.S.
position in the form of higher U.S. interest rates, or more
favorable entry prices via a weaker dollar or lower U.S. asset
prices. (One limitation of this scenario is that it does not allow
for such interest rate and asset price changes to promote a
narrowing of U.S. and global imbalances.)
Fuller participation by U.S. investors in the financial global-
ization process could also make it more challenging to finance
large current account deficits on favorable terms. Suppose that
outflows from the United States were to rise to 50 percent of
saving: the recent average for the rest of the world. (Given the
anemic U.S. saving rate, this amount would still leave outflows
from the United States unusually low as a share of GDP.) Again
assuming an unchanged current account deficit, the United
States would then have to receive roughly 40 percent of total
outflows from the rest of the world, up from the 30 percent
currently coming to the United States.
Conclusion
Perhaps surprisingly, large U.S. current account deficits have
not led to an unusual buildup in foreign investors’ holdings
of U.S. assets; in fact, foreign investment in the United States
has remained broadly in line with the relative size of the U.S.
economy and the U.S. capital markets. The key reason for
this outcome has been rapid financial globalization, with
cross-border flows worldwide rising as fast as flows into the
United States. Our results suggest that such globalization has
allowed the United States to finance large current account
deficits without experiencing sharper downward pressures
on the dollar and U.S. asset prices. However, a retreat from
the recent pace of financial globalization by foreign investors
or an increase in the rate at which U.S. investors buy foreign
assets could make it more difficult for the country to sustain
a large current account deficit on favorable terms.
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